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Why the U.S. Treasury
Began Auctioning
Treasury Bills in 1929
1.  Introduction
he introduction of a new financial instrument by a 
sovereign issuer is never a trivial event. New instruments 
require the development of marketing programs and 
accounting systems, consume disproportionate amounts of 
senior executive time, and not infrequently require new 
statutory authority. It is hardly surprising that the United 
States has introduced only a handful of new instruments since 
the development of a liquid, national market for Treasury 
securities during World War I, including savings bonds, 
STRIPS, foreign-targeted Treasury notes, and TIPS (Box 1).
This article examines the U.S. Treasury’s decision to 
introduce a new financial instrument—Treasury bills—in 
1929. We show that Treasury officials were willing to commit 
the resources required to introduce the new security in order 
to mitigate several flaws in the structure of Treasury financing 
operations, such as:
￿ New debt offerings were chronically oversubscribed. Reliance 
on fixed-price subscription offerings of new debt during 
the 1920s resulted in chronic oversubscriptions, a clear 
indication that the offerings were persistently underpriced.
￿ The schedule for new debt sales resulted in negative “carry” 
on Treasury cash balances at commercial banks. The 
Treasury sold new debt only four times a year—on tax 
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• In the 1920s, there were several flaws in 
the structure of U.S. Treasury financing 
operations. 
￿ The flaws were attributable to the war-time 
practice of selling securities in fixed-price 
subscription offerings and the newer practice 
of limiting Treasury debt sales to quarterly 
dates.
￿ In 1929, the Treasury introduced a new 
financial instrument to mitigate these flaws. 
￿ Treasury bills were auctioned rather than 
offered for sale at a fixed price and were sold 
on an as-needed basis instead of on a 
quarterly schedule.
￿ By introducing a new class of securities, the 
Treasury was able to address the defects in 
the existing primary market structure even 
as it continued to maintain that structure. 
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payment dates—and was consequently forced to borrow 
in advance of its needs and to inventory the proceeds in 
commercial bank accounts that earned interest at a rate 
lower than that paid by the Treasury on its indebtedness, 
resulting in negative carry on the account balances.
￿ The Treasury had to arrange short-term loans from 
Federal Reserve Banks to make maturity payments. 
Treasury officials set new issues to mature on tax 
payment dates. This schedule forced the Treasury to 
borrow from the Federal Reserve to bridge the gap 
between the date it needed to make a maturity payment 
and the date it actually collected tax receipts—typically 
several days after the stated due date. The short-term 
Reserve Bank loans sometimes created transient 
fluctuations in reserves available to the banking system 
and undesirable volatility in overnight interest rates.
We begin by describing in Section 2 the structure of 
Treasury financing operations in the mid-1920s and explaining 
how that structure had evolved in support of an important 
objective of federal fiscal policy: paying down, as expeditiously 
as possible, the debt incurred in the course of financing World 
War I. Section 3 describes the flaws in the structure of Treasury 
financing operations, and Section 4 shows how Treasury 
officials planned to correct or mitigate the flaws with Treasury 
bills. The evolution of bill financing in the early 1930s is 
described briefly in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Treasury Financing Operations
in the Mid-1920s
The two principal objectives of federal fiscal policy in the 1920s 
were tax reduction and paying down the war debt. In mid-
1914, there was only $968 million of interest-bearing Treasury 
debt outstanding; by mid-1919, the debt had ballooned to 
$25.2 billion.1 Over the same period, the maximum tax rate on 
personal income had increased from 7 percent to 77 percent.2
Political leaders recognized that the tax system had become 
badly warped in the haste of responding to wartime 
requirements. In his 1919 State of the Union message, 
President Woodrow Wilson suggested that
Congress might well consider whether the higher rates 
of income and profits taxes can in peace times be 
effectively productive of revenue, and whether they may 
not, on the contrary, be destructive of business activity 
and productive of waste and inefficiency. There is a 
point at which in peace times high rates of income and 
profits taxes discourage energy, remove the incentive to 
new enterprise, encourage extravagant expenditures, 
and produce industrial stagnation.3
President Wilson’s first post-war Secretary of the Treasury, 
Carter Glass, argued that the tax system encouraged “wasteful 
expenditure,” penalized “brains, energy, and enterprise,” and 
discouraged new ventures.4 Promptly after being sworn in as 
President on March 4, 1921, Warren Harding called a special 
session of the Congress to reduce personal and corporate taxes.5
Despite the intense interest in tax reduction, there was near-
universal agreement that taxes should not be cut to levels that 
would impede expeditious debt reduction. In his address to 
11914 Treasury Annual Report, p. 46, and 1919 Treasury Annual Report, p. 186.
2 Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act, October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 114, and Revenue 
Act of 1918, February 24, 1919, 40 Stat. 1057.
3 “Text of President Wilson’s Message to Congress, Urging Return to Peace 
Basis,” New York Times, December 3, 1919, p. 6.
4 1919 Treasury Annual Report, p. 23.  
5 “Harding Will Call Special Session for April 4 or 11,” New York Times, 
March 8, 1921, p. 1, and “President to Call Congress April 11,” New York Times, 
March 15, 1921, p. 1. See also “President’s Address to Congress on Domestic 
and Foreign Policies,” New York Times, April 13, 1921, p. 7 (quoting Harding’s 
comment that “The most substantial relief from the tax burden must come for the 
present from the readjustment of internal taxes, and the revision or repeal of those 
taxes which have become unproductive and are so artificial and burdensome as to 
defeat their own purpose.”), and Smiley and Keehn (1995, p. 287) (by 1920, “Both 
Democrats and Republicans believed that . . . tax avoidance had reduced the 
revenue collected from the wealthiest Americans . . . .”).
Box 1
New Financial Instruments Introduced
by the U.S. Treasury after 1918
Savings Bonds
Single-payment, intermediate-term non-marketable securities 
with fixed-price redemption options. Introduced in March 1935.
Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal
of Securities (STRIPS)
Single-payment securities derived by separating the principal and 
interest payments bundled together in conventional Treasury 
notes and bonds. Introduced in February 1985.
Foreign-Targeted Treasury Notes
Notes providing for limited disclosure of ownership when owned 
by “United States Aliens.”a Four foreign-targeted notes were sold 
between October 1984 and February 1986.
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS)
Coupon-bearing notes and bonds with principal and interest 
payments indexed to the consumer price index. Introduced in 
January 1997.
aA United States Alien is defined as a foreign corporation, nonresident 
alien individual, nonresident alien fiduciary of a foreign estate or trust, 
and certain related foreign partnerships. Treasury Circular no. 31-84, 
October 10, 1984, and Garbade (1987).FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2008 33
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the special session of the Congress in 1921, President Harding 
announced a policy of “orderly funding and gradual 
liquidation” of the debt.6 Three years later, in the course 
of arguing for a second round of tax cuts, Secretary of the 
Treasury Andrew Mellon cautioned that “the Government 
must always be assured that taxes will not be so far reduced 
as to deprive the Treasury of sufficient revenue with which 
properly to run its business . . . and to take care of the debt.”7 
Debt reduction, Secretary Mellon claimed, was “the best 
method of bringing about tax reduction. Aside from gradual 
refunding at lower rates of interest, it is the only method of 
reducing the heavy annual interest charges.”8
Remarkably, the federal government was able to reduce 
both tax rates and the national debt in the 1920s. In a series of 
three revenue measures adopted between 1921 and 1926, the 
Congress reduced tax rates on personal income to a maximum 
of 25 percent.9 Treasury receipts fell from their high-water 
6 “President’s Address to Congress on Domestic and Foreign Policies,” New York 
Times, April 13, 1921, p. 7. Emphasis added. Cannadine (2006, p. 278) describes 
Harding’s economic agenda as a restoration of “the prewar climate of low taxes, 
balanced budgets, manageable national debt, limited government, and a 
functioning international economy backed by the gold standard.”
7 Mellon (1924, p. 20). Emphasis added.
8 1924 Treasury Annual Report, p. 26. Mellon reiterated his view of the link 
between debt reduction and tax reduction in 1926: “As long as there are 
enormous fixed debt charges . . . no large reduction in total expenditures is 
possible. . . . [T]he more rapidly the debt is retired, the sooner will come the 
time when these charges can be practically eliminated.” 1926 Treasury Annual 
Report, pp. 33-4.
mark of $6.75 billion in fiscal year 1920 to $4 billion in 1922 in 
the wake of a severe post-war recession, but then leveled off—
and even rose a bit in the second half of the decade—as a result 
of rapidly expanding economic activity. At the same time, the 
Congress was able to effect significant expenditure reductions. 
The result was a budget surplus in every fiscal year from 1920 
to 1930 (Chart 1). The surpluses underwrote a 37 percent 
reduction in Treasury indebtedness—to $16 billion by the end 
of the decade.
To understand how the Treasury structured its financing 
operations to support the goal of debt reduction, we first have 
to understand how the war was financed.
2.1 Financing World War I
The entry of the United States into World War I, on April 6, 
1917, set off a prolonged national debate over whether the war 
should be financed with debt or taxes. Some, like Senator 
Furnifold Simmons of North Carolina, took a position at the 
debt end of the spectrum: “It has been the custom of this 
country to pay war bills by bond issues, and I see no reason for 
a change in that policy.”10 The nation’s most prominent 
financier, J. P. Morgan, believed that no more than 20 percent 
of war expenses should be paid from taxes; President Wilson’s 
wartime Secretary of the Treasury, William McAdoo, thought 
half was preferable.11 Further along the spectrum, the New York 
Times reported that “some members of Congress are 
advocating the raising of 75 per cent of the first year needs by 
taxation,” and leading economists at forty-three colleges and 
universities signed a petition urging taxation as the principal 
means of finance.12
The central issue was whether debt could transfer the 
burden of the war to future generations. Economists agreed 
that it could—if the debt were sold to foreigners.13 In that case, 
the war might require little sacrifice in current living standards. 
9 See Blakey (1922, 1924, and 1926), Smiley and Keehn (1995), Murnane 
(2004), and Cannadine (2006, pp. 287-8 and 313-8).
10 Quoted in Adams (1917, p. 292).
Despite the intense interest in tax 
reduction, there was near-universal 
agreement that taxes should not be cut
to levels that would impede expeditious 
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The debt would have to be repaid, but repayment would be 
funded from taxes imposed on later generations. However, 
since there were no other countries from which to borrow in 
1917 (Japan was the only major country not already involved 
in the conflict), there was no essential difference—from an 
aggregate point of view—between debt financing and tax 
financing. Either way, the entire cost of the war had to be 
borne immediately, by Americans, in the form of reduced 
consumption.14
Economists also agreed that debt financing and tax 
financing differed at a disaggregated level and that debt 
financing facilitated intertemporal reallocations of the burdens 
of war among individuals. Roy Blakey, an economist at the 
University of Minnesota, observed that “when a war comes 
unexpectedly it may find many individuals unprepared to pay 
their just shares of a new and large burden. It may be best all 
around to permit some to assume the burden of others 
temporarily, either wholly or in part.”15 Blakey appreciated 
that individuals as well as governments can borrow, but he 
concluded that there were good reasons to prefer public, rather 
than private, finance: “In so far as the government can make 
easier advantageous credit transactions by itself assuming the 
borrowing agency instead of leaving the transactions to be 
arranged through individuals, there is a further net gain.”16
11 Morgan’s view is reported in McAdoo (1931, p. 383). For McAdoo, see 
“Senate Will Pass Bond Bill Quickly,” New York Times, April 13, 1917, p. 3 
(“McAdoo believes that about half the expenses of the war should be paid from 
current revenues….”), McAdoo (1931, p. 372) (“I hoped to raise about half of 
the expenditures through taxes.”), and the April 14, 1917, letter from McAdoo 
to Cleveland H. Dodge, a prominent philanthropist and Princeton classmate of 
Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Synon (1924, pp. 222-3) (“As to taxation, my 
feeling has been that fifty per cent of the cost of the war should be financed by 
it.”). McAdoo later revised his thinking to one-third taxes and two-thirds debt. 
See his letter to the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee quoted 
in “M’Adoo Advises Doubling War Tax,” New York Times, June 7, 1918, p. 1 
(“I believe that if we are to preserve the soundness and stability of our financial 
system, we should raise by taxation not less than one-third of the estimated 
expenditures for the fiscal year 1919….”).
12 “Big War Loan Bill Ready for Debate,” New York Times, April 12, 1917, p. 2, 
“Economists United in Favor of War Tax,” New York Times, April 19, 1917, p. 24, 
“College Men Want Direct Taxes Instead of Bonds,” Boston Daily Globe, 
April 19, 1917, p. 7, and “Taxation is Favored to Meet War Expenses,” 
Atlanta Constitution, April 19, 1917, p. 6.
13 See, for example, Blakey (1918, p. 92).
The question of debt versus tax financing was resolved 
during the course of the war in a series of incremental actions, 
including especially new tax legislation.17 Chart 2 shows 
Treasury receipts and expenditures prior to and during the 
war. Assuming (based on the pre-war data) “normal” receipts 
and expenditures of about $750 million per year, approximately 
one quarter of the cost of the war was financed with war taxes.18
14 See, for example, Anderson (1917, p. 860) (“Our own citizens must pay now 
out of current income whatever the government spends now, and, taking the 
nation as a whole, it is simply impossible for ‘posterity to share the burdens’. . . .”) 
and Durand (1917, p. 892) (“For the people considered as a whole, domestic 
borrowing postpones no burden to the future . . . . Borrowing at home, so far 
as a nation as a whole is concerned, is precisely similar to borrowing by an 
individual from himself . . . . The idea that the burden of war expenditures can be 
deferred to future generations is the supreme fallacy of finance.”) Emphasis in the 
original.
15 Blakey (1918, p. 93). See also Blakey (1917, p. 813) (“Among persons of equal 
means, some are in a much better position to economize at this time than are 
others; hence, some borrowing is socially justifiable because it allows 
accommodation as between individuals.”) and Durand (1917, pp. 906-7).  
16 Blakey (1918, p. 94).
17 The major wartime tax acts were the War Revenue Act of 1917, October 3, 
1917, 40 Stat. 300, and the Revenue Act of 1918. See Blakey (1917) and Blakey 
and Blakey (1919).
18 Annual fiscal year receipts and expenditures in excess of “normal,” in billions 
of dollars, were:
Receipts Expenditures
1917 $0.374 $  1.336
1918    3.430  13.043
1919    3.904    18.202
Total $7.708 $32.581
The total excess of war-related tax receipts of $7.7 billion was 23.7 percent 
of the $32.6 billion in excess expenditures.
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The Treasury raised $21.5 billion during 
the war by floating five enormous Liberty 
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The Treasury raised $21.5 billion during the war by floating 
five enormous Liberty loans (Table 1); it also raised additional 
sums with monthly—sometimes biweekly—sales of short-term 
certificates of indebtedness. (Certificates of indebtedness were 
coupon-bearing securities that matured in a year or less. There 
was $3.45 billion in certificates outstanding in mid-1919.)
All wartime security sales were by subscription. Treasury 
officials set the coupon rate on a new issue and then offered it 
to investors at a price of par. Subscription books for the Liberty 
loans remained open for three or four weeks; subscription 
books for certificates of indebtedness remained open for as 
little as one day, more typically for several weeks, and in one 
exceptional case for almost three months, depending on the 
pace of sales and how much the Treasury wanted to sell.19 The 
Treasury sometimes sold a fixed amount of Liberty loans that it 
specified ex ante (as in the sales of the First Liberty bonds and 
the Victory Liberty notes—see Table 1) and sometimes filled all 
subscriptions in full (as in the sales of the Third and Fourth 
19 Subscription books for the first series of certificates offered to the public 
opened—and closed—on the same day that President Wilson signed the First 
Liberty Bond Act, April 24, 1917, 40 Stat. 35, that authorized their issue. 
“Secretary McAdoo to Sell Certificates,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1917, p. 5, 
“Loan Will Be Made at Once,” New York Times, April 25, 1917, p. 1, and “U.S. 
Certificates to be Paid for Today,” Wall Street Journal, April 25, 1927, p. 8. 
A later certificate series, designated series T-G, remained open from mid-
August to early November 1918. “Tax Certificates at 4½% Meet Investment 
Conditions,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 1918, p. 10, and 1918 Treasury 
Annual Report, pp. 215-6. See also “U.S. Tax Certificates Have Five Coupons 
Attached,” Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1918, p. 10.
Liberty bonds). In cases where investors subscribed for an 
amount more than Treasury officials wanted to sell, officials 
allotted securities on the basis of order size, with a preference 
given to small orders to effect a broader distribution to retail 
investors. Table 2 presents an example.
To facilitate subscriptions to Liberty loans and certificates 
of indebtedness, the Treasury and the twelve district Federal 
Reserve Banks (acting as fiscal agents for the United States) 
created and managed a system of “War Loan Deposit 
Accounts” at commercial banks around the country.20 A bank 
typically paid for its own and its customers’ purchases of 
Treasury securities by crediting the War Loan Deposit Account 
that the Treasury maintained at the bank. When funds were 
needed to meet expenses, the Treasury would request that some 
of the balances be transferred to Treasury accounts at Federal 
Reserve Banks (from which the Treasury paid most of the bills 
of the federal government). The system of War Loan accounts 
was important because it encouraged subscriptions: banks 
could pay for their purchases and the purchases of their 
customers with deposit credits in lieu of “immediately 
available” funds, that is, funds on deposit at a Federal Reserve 
Bank.21 War Loan deposit liabilities were relatively inexpensive 
20 Section 7 of the First Liberty Bond Act provided that “the Secretary of the 
Treasury, in his discretion, is hereby authorized to deposit in such banks and 
trust companies as he may designate the proceeds . . .  arising from the sale of 
the bonds and certificates of indebtedness authorized by this Act . . . .” The 
system of War Loan accounts was the forerunner of the modern Treasury Tax 
and Loan system. See Garbade, Partlan, and Santoro (2004), Lovett (1978), 
McDonough (1976), and Brockschmidt (1975).
Table 1
Liberty Loans
      
       First Second Third Fourth Victory Liberty Loan
Description Thirty-year bond,
callable in fifteen years
Twenty-five-year bond,




callable in fifteen years
Four-year note,
callable in three years
Coupon rate
  (percent) 3½ 4 4¼ 4¼
3¾ if nontaxable,
4¾ if taxable
Dated date June 15, 1917 November 15, 1917 May 9, 1918 October 24, 1918 May 20, 1919
First call date June 15, 1932 November 15, 1927 Not callable October 15, 1933 June 15, 1922
Maturity date June 15, 1947 November 15, 1942 September 15, 1928 October 15, 1938 May 20, 1923
Amount offered
  (billions of dollars) 2.0 3.0 3.0 6.0 4.5
Amount subscribed
  (billions of dollars) 3.0 4.6 4.2 7.0 5.2
Amount sold
  (billions of dollars) 2.0 3.8 4.2 7.0 4.5
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and cost banks only 2 percent per annum.22 (By comparison, 
borrowing from a Federal Reserve Bank cost between 3 and 
4½ percent per annum in 1917 and 1918.)23
2.2 The Mechanics of Paying Down the Debt
The principal problem facing Treasury debt managers in the 
1920s was how to pay down the large Liberty loans with 
budget surpluses that became available only gradually over 
time. They solved the problem with a carefully constructed 
program of 1) exchange offers of new notes and bonds for 
Liberty loans approaching maturity, 2) cash refinancings (with 
short-term certificates and intermediate-term notes) of 
maturing Liberty loans, and 3) cash repurchases of debt near 
maturity and cash redemptions at maturity. Tilford Gaines, 
in his groundbreaking study of Treasury debt management, 
concluded that “the decade of the 1920’s witnessed what is 
probably the most effective execution of debt management 
policy, in a technical sense, in the history of the country.”24 
Gaines pointed out that
Policy actions of the 1920’s were directed toward 
specific, clearly-stated objectives. Maturing securities 
were redeemed if funds were available . . .  if not, they 
21 Additionally, the War Loan Deposit Account System avoided draining 
reserves from the private banking system into Treasury accounts at Federal 
Reserve Banks when investors paid for their securities.
22 The 2 percent rate was established prior to the war for an earlier depository 
system that was limited to national banks. See “Banks Must Pay 2 Per Cent,” 
New York Times, April 24, 1912, p. 15, “Government Special Deposits,” Wall 
Street Journal, April 25, 1912, p. 8, “Money,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1912, 
p. 8, “Must Pay Interest on Nation’s Cash,” New York Times, May 1, 1913, p. 1, 
“Banks Must Pay Interest on All Government Deposits,” Wall Street Journal, 
May 2, 1913, p. 8, 1912 Treasury Annual Report, p. 149, and 1913 Treasury 
Annual Report, pp. 5 and 211. 
23 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, p. 439).
24 Gaines (1962, p. 27).
were refunded to a carefully selected niche in the debt 
structure where, when they matured, funds might be 
expected to be available to redeem them.25
and that
At a purely technical level, the job done by Secretary 
Mellon during the 1920’s was superb. Each operation, 
whether intra-year certificate financing or refunding 
the Liberty and Victory loans, was carefully planned 
and conducted through a series of steps that at no time 
overstrained the market’s absorptive capacity. The 
program was orderly, with ample advance notice to the 
market before each step, and predictable, in the sense 
that the Secretary’s program and intentions were clearly 
understood.26
Treasury indebtedness stood at $22 billion in mid-1923 
(Table 3). During the preceding four years, the Treasury had 
paid off the Victory notes, reduced the outstanding amount of 
the four remaining Liberty bonds to $15 billion, and reduced 
the short-term debt to $1 billion. In the process, it had issued 
$4 billion of new notes maturing between June 1924 and 
December 1927 (Table 4) as well as a modest amount
($760 million) of new bonds. The new notes had been issued 
for two reasons: to refinance $2.6 billion of short-term 
certificates of indebtedness to dates after the Victory notes 
matured in May 1923 but before the Third Liberty bonds came 
25 Gaines (1962, p. 29).
26 Gaines (1962, p. 34).
Table 2
Subscription Allotments on First Liberty Loan
Subscription Allotment
Up to and including $10,000 100 percent
$10,000 to $100,000 60 percent, but not less than $10,000
$100,000 to $250,000 45 percent, but not less than $60,000
$250,000 to $2,000,000 30 percent, but not less than $112,500
$2,000,000 to $6,000,000 25 percent, but not less than $600,000
$6,000,000 to $10,000,000 21 percent
Over $10,000,000 Average of 20.2 percent
Source: 1917 Treasury Annual Report, p. 8.
Table 3
Treasury Debt in Mid-1923
Billions of Dollars
      
Pre-war debt 0.87
Liberty  Loans
   First Liberty Bond 1.95
   Second Liberty Bond 3.20
   Third Liberty Bond 3.41
   Fourth Liberty Bond 6.33
      Total 14.89
Post-war debt
   Certificates of indebtedness 1.03
   Notes 4.10
   Bonds 0.76
      Total 5.89
Other debt 0.35
Total debt 22.01
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due in September 1928, and to refinance a portion of the 
maturing Victory notes.
All the new notes matured on the fifteenth of the third 
month of a calendar quarter—when most individuals and 
corporations made quarterly income tax payments.27 This 
was no accident; rather, it was part of a larger scheme 
designed to facilitate redemption of the notes and, more 
generally, redemption of the war debt. As a tax payment date 
approached, Treasury officials estimated the receipts they 
were about to receive and the funds they were likely to 
disburse during the coming quarter. They used balances 
in Treasury accounts at Federal Reserve Banks and in War 
Loan Deposit Accounts at commercial banks equal to the 
estimated excess of receipts over expenditures to redeem 
some of the maturing debt, and they refinanced the 
remainder to a subsequent tax date.28 The 1922 Treasury 
Annual Report noted that the practice of having issues 
27 The Revenue Act of 1918 provided that the tax on income earned in a 
particular year was due in four quarterly installments during the following 
year, on March 15, June 15, September 15, and December 15.
28 See, for example, 1926 Treasury Annual Report, p. 35 (“A few weeks prior 
to the 15th of each September, December, March, and June the Treasury 
determines what income it will need to meet expenditures during the coming 
quarter, taking into account, on the receipt side, the cash in the general fund 
and the Government receipts to be expected, and, on the expenditure side, the 
amount of cash required to meet obligations maturing during the quarter, and 
the probable expenses of the Government during the quarter.”) and p. 39 
(“New issues of public debt securities in regular course are made only on tax-
payment dates and the amount of the issue is determined by the estimated cash 
requirements of the Treasury to the next payment date in excess of the cash in 
hand and the estimated receipts from taxes and other sources of revenue.”).
mature on quarterly tax dates absorbed “any surplus 
revenues which may be available. This gives the best 
assurance of the gradual retirement of the war debt, and is 
perhaps the greatest advantage of the short-term [that is, 
note] refunding which the Treasury has been carrying on, 
for by distributing the debt over early maturities in amounts 
not too large to be financed each year these refunding 
operations have given the Treasury control over the debt 
and its retirement. . . .”29
Table 5 illustrates how the scheme worked. The first 
column shows the four tax payment dates in 1925. The 
second column shows the amount of securities maturing on 
each of the four dates. The third shows the amount of 
securities issued on each date, including a 29¾-year bond in 
March and certificates of indebtedness in every quarter. The 
fourth shows the amount paid down.
The “regularization” of Treasury financing operations on 
quarterly tax dates was an important innovation in Treasury 
debt management.30 The regularity enhanced the 
predictability of Treasury operations and facilitated the 
integration of Treasury debt management with Treasury 
cash management. Nevertheless, the system was not 
flawless. The maturities of new certificates varied erratically 
from quarter to quarter (Chart 3), and the sizes of new 
offerings also varied widely, depending on the amount 
maturing and the magnitude of anticipated tax receipts and 
expected expenditures (Chart 4). These features reduced the 
predictability of two important aspects of a financing: 
amount and term to maturity.31 On balance, however, the 
29 1922 Treasury Annual Report, p. 9. See also 1923 Treasury Annual Report, p. 20 
(“Except for the issue of about $750,000,000 of 25-30 year Treasury bonds in 
the fall of 1922, the refunding has all been on a short-term basis, and it has been 
arranged with a view to distributing the early maturities of debt at convenient 
intervals over the period before the maturity of the third Liberty loan in 1928 
in such manner that surplus revenues may be applied most effectively to the 
gradual reduction of the debt. With this object in view all of the short-term 
notes issued in the course of the refunding have been given maturities on 
quarterly tax-payment dates, and all outstanding issues of Treasury certificates 
have likewise been reduced to tax maturities.”)
30 There were only two cases after 1922 when certificates of indebtedness were 
sold on other than a tax payment date: an issue of 213-day certificates sold in 
November 1927 to finance the redemption of Second Liberty bonds and an 
issue of 335-day certificates sold in October 1928 to finance the redemption of 
Third Liberty bonds.
Table 4
Treasury Notes Issued between 1921 and 1923








June 15, 1921 5¾ June 15, 1924 311
September 15, 1921 5½ September 15, 1924 391
February 1, 1922 4¾ March 15, 1925 602
December 15, 1922 4½ June 15, 1925 469
June 15, 1922 4¾ December 15, 1925 335
March 15, 1922 4¾ March 15, 1926 618
August 1, 1922 4¼ September 15, 1926 487
May 15, 1923 4¾ March 15, 1927 668
January 15, 1923 4½ December 15, 1927 367
Total 4,248
Source: Treasury annual reports.
The “regularization” of Treasury financing 
operations on quarterly tax dates was an 
important innovation in Treasury debt 
management.38 Why the U.S. Treasury Began Auctioning Treasury Bills in 1929
Source: Treasury annual reports.
Note: Dark circles are certificates issued on tax payment dates; white
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program of regular quarterly financings was an innovative 
solution to the problem of paying down large debt issues with 
budget surpluses that became available only gradually, on a 
quarterly basis.
31 In contrast, the Treasury regularized term to maturity and offering amounts 
as well as offering dates when it adopted a “regular and predictable” issuance 
strategy for notes and bonds in the 1970s (Garbade 2007).
3.  Structural Flaws in Treasury 
Financing Operations
There were several important structural flaws in Treasury 
financing operations in the mid- and late 1920s. The flaws, all 
of which were well understood by early 1929, were attributable 
to the continuation of the wartime practices of selling securities 
in fixed-price subscription offerings and allowing banks to pay 
for purchases of securities with War Loan Deposit Account 
Table 5
Refinancings and Paydowns on Tax Payment Dates in 1925
      
Amount (Millions of Dollars)
Date Maturing Issued Paid Down Refinancing Securities
March 15, 1925 560 509 51 $219 million of a nine-month certificate maturing December 15, 1925,
and $290 million of a 29¾-year bond maturing December 15, 1954
June 15, 1925 400 124 276 One-year certificate maturing June 15, 1926
September 15, 1925 250 252 -2 Nine-month certificate maturing June 15, 1926
December 15, 1925 480 453 27 One-year certificate maturing December 15, 1925
Sources: 1925 Treasury Annual Report, pp. 32 and 33; 1926 Treasury Annual Report, p. 41; “Treasury to Issue 4% Bonds at Premium,” Wall Street Journal, 
March 5, 1925, p. 8; “June Funding Issue Lowest Since War,” New York Times, June 8, 1925, p. 24; “New Treasury Issue Is $250,000,000,” New York Times, 
September 8, 1925, p. 32; and “Treasury Will Seek a $450,000,000 Loan,” New York Times, December 7, 1925, p. 37.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2008 39
Source: Treasury annual reports.
Billions of dollars
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credits, in addition to the newer practice of limiting Treasury 
debt sales to quarterly dates.
3.1 Fixed-Price Subscription Offerings
Fixed-price subscription offerings gave Treasury officials an 
incentive to offer securities at cheap prices, relative to 
contemporaneous market conditions, to limit the risk of a 
failed offering.
The risk of a failed offering was more than conjectural. In 
March 1920, Treasury officials proposed to raise between $300 and 
$350 million in an offering of one-year certificates.32 Investors 
resisted what they believed to be an unreasonably low interest rate 
of 4¾ percent. In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury Russell Leffingwell, New York bankers expressed intense 
dissatisfaction with the rate and suggested that the new certificates 
should pay “at least” 5 percent.33 Investors subscribed for only 
$200 million of the certificates, even though officials kept the 
subscription books open for two weeks after the issue date.34 The 
New York Times described the response as “disappointingly small” 
and the Wall Street Journal labeled the 4¾ percent rate “a 
mistake.”35 Two-and-a-half years later, in December 1922, the 
Treasury offered a total of $400 million in three-month and one-
year certificates, but garnered only $310 million in subscriptions, 
including $45 million in last-minute subscriptions from three 
Federal Reserve Banks.36 These episodes gave Treasury officials 
clear incentives to avoid pricing their offerings close to the market, 
that is, selecting coupon rates close to contemporaneous market 
yields on outstanding issues with similar maturities.
Oversubscriptions—the principal indicia of underpricing—
were a persistent characteristic of Treasury offerings 
throughout the 1920s (Chart 5). The Wall Street Journal 
pointed out the problem as early as April 1921: “The fact that 
there has been a big over-subscription to recent offerings of 
certificates of indebtedness, suggests that the rate fixed for the 
certificates has lately been slightly higher than the money 
market warranted.”37 A month later, the Wall Street Journal 
32 “The Certificate Sale,” New York Times, March 23, 1920, p. 18.
33 “Treasury Offers New 4¾% Tax Certificates,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 
1920, p. 12 (characterizing the bankers as “vexed”).
34 1920 Treasury Annual Report, p. 15.
35 “The Certificate Sale,” New York Times, March 23, 1920, p. 18, and “Treasury 
Made Mistake in Certificate Rate at 4¾%,” Wall Street Journal, March 30, 1920, 
p. 12.
36 1923 Treasury Annual Report, pp. 51-2, and letter dated December 16, 1922, 
from Under Secretary of the Treasury S. Parker Gilbert to Charles Morss, 
Governor, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Archive File no. 410.5.
37 “Government Borrowing by Tender Suggested Here,” Wall Street Journal, 
April 14, 1921, p. 4.
remarked on the advantage of auctioning securities: “Bankers 
point out that [the $275 million oversubscription on an 
offering of $200 million of nine-month certificates] is another 
illustration of the advantage that might have been afforded by 
adopting the system of offering the certificates at tender. Had 
they been offered by tender a considerable saving might have 
been effected.”38
3.2 Infrequent Offerings
The decision to limit security sales to a quarterly schedule 
compelled the Treasury to borrow in advance of actual 
requirements and inventory the proceeds in War Loan 
accounts until they were needed. In testimony before the 
House Ways and Means Committee in May 1929, Under 
Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills observed that “it is 
reasonably clear that if you are going to borrow only four times 
a year, you have got to borrow in advance of requirements.”39 
This method was expensive because the 2 percent interest rate 
that the Treasury earned on War Loan accounts was less than 
what it paid on its certificates of indebtedness.
38 “Government Borrowing,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1921, p. 4.
39 Committee on Ways and Means (1929, p. 3).40 Why the U.S. Treasury Began Auctioning Treasury Bills in 1929
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3.3 Late Tax Payments
Late tax payments sometimes led to undesirable volatility in 
overnight loan markets. The 1925 Treasury Annual Report 
observed that, “Frequently payments [on maturing issues] 
exceed [tax] receipts on the tax day, making it necessary to 
borrow temporarily from the Federal reserve bank on a special 
securities of indebtedness [sic] in anticipation of the tax 
receipts which it takes several days to collect. This places 
reserve bank funds temporarily on the market and results in 
easier money rates. Rates tighten up again, however, when the 
loan is repaid, upon the collection of the tax checks.”40
3.4 Substitution of Treasury Deposits
for Other Sources of Funds
Banks learned in the 1920s that they could use Treasury securities 
subscriptions to substitute Treasury deposits for other, more 
expensive, sources of funds. A bank would first subscribe to a new 
offering, promising to pay by crediting the Treasury’s War Loan 
Deposit Account at the bank. After receiving notice of its 
allotment, the bank would sell the new securities for settlement on 
the issue date and, following settlement, use the proceeds to reduce 
other borrowings. The net result was a reduction in the cost of 
funds to 2 percent per annum during the period between the issue 
date of the securities and the date the Treasury called for its War 
Loan balances.
Substituting War Loan deposits for other sources of funds 
became increasingly attractive when the Reserve Banks began 
to raise discount rates in 1928 (Chart 6). Substitution made 
economic sense even if a bank had to sell its allotment at a 
discount from the par subscription price, as long as interest 
rates were high enough and the period in which the bank could 
expect to retain War Loan balances was long enough. In June 
1928, the New York Times reported bank sales of new 
certificates at prices of 99-31/32 and 99-30, even though the 
certificates had been heavily oversubscribed:
40 1925 Treasury Annual Report, p. 44. See, for example, the episode described in 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Monthly Review, April 1, 1930, pp. 1-2, in 
which a temporary $200 million increase in member bank reserves led to a 
transient decline in call loan rates. Treasury borrowings from the Federal 
Reserve typically lasted for about five days. Committee on Ways and Means 
(1929, p. 9). To dampen these episodes of transient ease, the Reserve Banks 
sometimes sold participations in their Treasury loans to member banks. At other 
times, member banks used the surplus reserve balances to reduce temporarily their 
Reserve Bank borrowings. “New Factor Enters Treasury Financing,” New York 
Times, December 15, 1929, p. N11. Meltzer (2003, p. 203, n. 106) reports 
that, in July 1924, the Open Market Investment Committee (a forerunner of 
the Federal Open Market Committee) approved a proposal to sell and 
repurchase securities to reduce transient dips in money market rates during tax 
payment periods. Beckhart, Smith, and Brown (1932, p. 357) describe other 
methods of draining excess reserves.
This paradox of an issue being apparently heavily 
oversubscribed [at a primary market offering price of 
par] at the same time that [secondary market] sales are 
being made below par was explained by conditions in 
the money market and the opportunity for profit arising 
out of the methods by which the Government securities 
are sold to the banks, their largest purchasers. When 
Government securities are awarded on subscription the 
banks do not pay for them at once, but credit the 
Treasury’s account with the sum involved. This money 
is left on deposit until the Treasury calls for it, a period 
which is usually two or three weeks and sometimes 
stretches into months. The banks pay the Treasury 
2 per cent interest on these deposits.41
The following April, the New York Times reported that wide 
spreads between open market interest rates and the War Loan 
Deposit Account rate gave banks an incentive “to bid for larger 
amounts of Treasury securities than they ordinarily would take, 
and they often sell the securities as soon as they are allotted. At 
times, this produces the spectacle of a Treasury issue being 
heavily over-subscribed and simultaneously selling below par . . .  
a situation that makes for confusion and artificial values in 
Treasury financing.”42
In response to bank oversubscriptions for, and prompt sales 
of, new Treasury offerings, nonbank investors began to abstain 
from subscribing for new issues, electing instead to acquire the 
securities in post-offering secondary market transactions. 
41 “Sales Reported in Treasury Issue,” New York Times, June 9, 1928, p. 25.
42 “New Treasury Plan Similar to English,” New York Times, April 28, 1929, p. 39.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2008 41
Under Secretary Mills summed up the problem in his 1929 
testimony before the Ways and Means Committee:
“There has grown up recently a practice on the part of 
the banks which was somewhat detrimental to the credit 
of the Government. Banks unquestionably subscribe for 
Government certificates because of the deposit privilege. 
During the last year or so, which has been a period of 
tight money, a practice has developed on the part of the 
banks of selling these certificates sometimes even before 
they are issued. In other words a bank can afford to 
subscribe for these certificates and sell them at a loss of 
say two-thirty-seconds or four-thirty-seconds and even 
six-thirty-seconds and still show a profit on the 
transaction, providing it can keep the Government 
deposit for 30 or 40 days. What the bank is really doing 
is borrowing from the Government of the United States 
at 2 per cent for 30 or 40 days, and it can use that money 
at once to pay off its indebtedness to the Federal reserve 
bank, in which it is paying 5 per cent. It can of course 
afford under these circumstances to sell these certificates 
at a discount. So that Government certificates during the 
course of the last year have sold at less than par almost 
immediately when they were issued. And, of course, 
those corporations and individuals who want to invest 
in Government securities, having observed that they 
show a tendency to go below par almost immediately 
after issue, refrain from putting in their subscriptions 
at the time the certificates are offered and rely on their 
ability to buy them in the market afterwards.43
Allowing banks to pay for securities with War Loan Deposit 
Account credits did not benefit either the Treasury or the 
banks. The Treasury gained by being able to issue securities to 
banks at a higher price than the general public was willing to 
pay, but earned only 2 percent on the proceeds left on deposit 
with the banks. Banks gained from accessing cheap Treasury 
balances, but lost when they sold certificates to nonbank 
investors at prices below par. Nonbank investors neither 
gained nor lost (as long as they waited to buy securities in the 
secondary market). The principal consequence of the scheme 
was a primary market increasingly limited to banks and opaque 
to the general public.
3.5 Summary
By the beginning of 1929, Treasury officials understood the 
flaws in the existing structure of Treasury financing operations:
1) Fixed-price subscription offerings resulted in chronic 
oversubscriptions, a clear indication that offerings were 
persistently underpriced.
43 Committee on Ways and Means (1929, pp. 4-5).
2) Infrequent quarterly financings forced the Treasury to 
borrow in advance of its needs and to inventory the 
proceeds in low-yielding War Loan Deposit Accounts.
3) Late tax payments forced the Treasury to fund the 
redemption of debt maturing on tax payment dates with 
Federal Reserve Bank loans.
4) The ability of banks to pay for new issues by crediting War 
Loan accounts led to the substitution of War Loan 
deposits for other sources of funds, led banks to further 
oversubscribe for new issues (in order to generate larger 
War Loan balances), and contributed to the appearance of 
a weak secondary market in new issues. The anomaly of 
oversubscribed issues selling below the par subscription 
price suggests that Treasury officials priced securities too 
high for nonbank investors in 1928 and 1929, even if they 
were cheap for bank subscribers.
The next section describes how Treasury officials mitigated 
the flaws in their financing operations.
4.  Introduction of Treasury Bills
In early 1929, J. Herbert Case, the Deputy Governor of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, journeyed to London to 
study the British Treasury bill market. The study, undertaken at 
the behest of Under Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills, was 
intended to clarify whether the British system of issuing bills 
could be adapted for use in the United States.44 Upon his 
return, Case filed a report describing the British system (Box 2) 
and recommended that a variant of the system be introduced 
in the United States.45
Case’s plan had four major provisions:
1) Treasury bills would be auctioned rather than offered for 
sale at a fixed price. He pointed out that “Competitive 
44 Case’s trip was not his first involvement in this matter. In January 1928, Case 
provided a detailed analysis of the British bill market to Benjamin Strong, 
Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in which he explored 
several ways the British system could be adapted to American markets. Memo 
dated January 4, 1928, from Case to Strong, “Discussion of method of handling 
short term debt by United States Treasury, including comparison with British 
Treasury method,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Archive File no. 413.7. 
In his 1928 memo, Case focused on the use of regular, possibly weekly, bill 
offerings to reduce Treasury borrowings before funds were needed, but also 
noted the advantages inherent in auctioning bills. He further noted that 
reliance on bill financing could result in the demise of the War Loan Deposit 
Account system, and he questioned whether such a demise would be a desirable 
result: “The depositary bank system was built up during the war and was 
unquestionably of great value to the Treasury in floating the war debt and in its 
subsequent refunding.”
45 The report is attached to a letter dated February 16, 1929, from Case to 
Under Secretary Mills, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Archive File 
no. 413.7. Case also visited the Banque de France but did not make any 
detailed study of French debt management techniques.  42 Why the U.S. Treasury Began Auctioning Treasury Bills in 1929
bidding . . .  might be expected to enable the Treasury to 
get the lowest discount rates consistent with current 
market conditions; it would not be necessary for the 
Treasury  . . .  to offer interest rates on new issues above 
current market rates.”
2) Bills would be sold when funds were needed.
3) Bill maturities would be set “to correspond closely to the 
actual collection of income taxes, and not all made to fall 
on the nominal date of tax payments as at present.”
4) Sales would be for cash, instead of credits to War Loan 
Deposit Accounts.
Point by point, these provisions would cure all of the existing 
flaws in the structure of Treasury financing operations. Case’s 
plan set the framework for the introduction of a new 
instrument to American financial markets.46
4.1 Obtaining Statutory Authority
to Issue Bills
In late April 1929, the Treasury unveiled its proposal to correct 
the defects in its financing operations. Senator Reed Smoot, 
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and 
Representative Willis Hawley, chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, took the first step by introducing 
legislation to allow the Treasury to issue zero-coupon bills with 
maturities of up to one year at a discount from face value.47 
(The Treasury needed new statutory authority to issue bills 
because existing statutes did not allow the sale of Treasury 
securities at a price less than par.)48
The proposed legislation required that the Treasury offer 
the new securities “on a competitive basis.”49 Officials viewed 
auction offerings as a key provision. Treasury Secretary Mellon 
stated that “Competitive bidding . . .  should enable the 
Treasury to get the lowest discount rates consistent with 
current market conditions.”50 In testimony before the Ways 
and Means Committee, Under Secretary Mills pointed out the 
burden of fixed-price offerings as well as the advantage of 
auctions:
46 “Case Heads Board of Reserve Bank,” New York Times, February 28, 1930, p. 14 
(commenting that Case’s 1929 report was the basis for the Treasury’s 
introduction of Treasury bills).
47 “Treasury for Sale of Notes Below Par,” New York Times, April 23, 1929, p. 27.
48 Section 5 of the Second Liberty Bond Act of September 24, 1917, 40 Stat. 288, 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue certificates of indebtedness “at 
not less than par.” Section 1 of the same act authorized the issue of bonds and 
required that they “first be offered at not less than par as a popular loan.” The 
Victory Liberty Loan Act of March 3, 1919, 40 Stat. 1309, authorized the issue 
of notes “at not less than par.” 
49 See H.R. 1648, reprinted in Committee on Ways and Means (1929, p. 1).
50 “Treasury for Sale of Notes Below Par,” New York Times, April 23, 1929, p. 27.
Box 2
The Primary Market for British Treasury Billsa
At the beginning of 1929, there was about £600 million in British 
Treasury bills outstanding. The British Treasury had been issuing 
bills since about 1877. Pre-war emissions were relatively small and 
infrequent, but issuance increased substantially during and 
following World War I.
British bills were auctioned weekly—on Friday, for settlement 
the following week—and matured three months later. Bidders 
submitted tenders that specified a price and amount as well as a 
settlement day sometime during the following week. Treasury 
officials sorted the tenders by settlement day and accepted 
proposals for a given settlement day in order of decreasing price 
until they had accounted for all of the funds needed to be raised on 
that day. Successful bidders paid for their bills with drafts on the 
Bank of England, that is, with immediately available funds.
The British system of bill financing—particularly the daily 
emissions and maturities—fitted nicely with the British income tax 
system. Although there were dates when taxes were nominally due, 
revenue officials had considerable discretion to arrange for 
alternative payment dates, so that payments did not all come in at 
virtually the same time. This ability eliminated any possibility of 
large, sporadic drains of reserve balances from the banking system 
and, taken together with the process of bill financing, made a 
system like the American War Loan Deposit Accounts 
unnecessary.b
aBased on memo dated January 4, 1928, from J. Herbert Case, Deputy 
Governor, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to Benjamin Strong, 
Governor, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Discussion of method 
of handling short term debt by United States Treasury, including 
comparison with British Treasury method,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Archive File no. 413.7, and report attached to letter dated 
February 16, 1929, from Case to Ogden Mills, Under Secretary of the 
Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Archive File no. 413.7. 
See also “New Treasury Plan Similar to English,” New York Times, 
April 28, 1929, p. 39.
bSee also address of Under Secretary Mills before the Washington 
Chapter of the American Institute of Banking on April 24, 1929, reprinted 
in 1929 Treasury Annual Report, p. 279 (“The Treasury bill has been used 
for many years by the British Treasury as a most convenient and 
economical medium to obtain funds to meet current needs. They have so 
developed the system of financing by means of Treasury bills that, with 
weekly offerings, daily issues, and daily maturities, they have obtained a 
degree of flexibility that enables the Treasury to adjust its cash positions 
practically from day to day.”) and “Mills Explains Aim of Treasury Bills,” 
New York Times, April 25, 1929, p. 42.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2008 43
[T]he Treasury has the difficult task of estimating 
accurately current market conditions so as to adjust the 
interest rate as closely as possible to those conditions, 
using the best judgment that it can. It is not as difficult 
as it seems and yet, with money conditions fluctuating 
very rapidly from day to day, it is not an easy thing . . .  . 
It would be more desirable both from the standpoint of 
the Treasury and I think of the public, if the market 
itself, by competitive bidding, should fix the interest 
rate, rather than have the Secretary of the Treasury use 
his best judgment in fixing the rate.51
Mills expressed the view that “the market will adjust the 
interest rate much more closely to actual market conditions 
than we can. We rather expect that these bids will be made in 
terms of one twenty-fifth of 1 per cent.”52 (At the time, the 
Treasury was setting coupon rates on certificates of 
indebtedness in increments of 1/8 percent.)
The Congress quickly approved the proposed legislation, and 
President Hoover signed it into law on June 17, 1929.53 During the 
following six months, Treasury officials worked out the details of 
the new security, such as the wording that would appear on the 
face of a bill and how it would be sold to the public.
4.2 The First Auction
On Tuesday, December 10, 1929, the Treasury announced the 
first bill auction, offering $100 million of ninety-day bills for 
settlement on Tuesday, December 17, to mature Monday, 
March 17, 1930.54 Auction tenders were due by 2 p.m. on 
Friday, December 13. Each tender had to state the amount bid 
for and a bid price, specified as a percentage of face amount 
with three digits of precision to the right of the decimal point55 
51 Committee on Ways and Means (1929, p. 3).
52 Committee on Ways and Means (1929, p. 4).  
53 The Act of June 17, 1929, 46 Stat. 19, provided that the original issue 
discount on a bill was interest income and would be exempt from state and 
federal income taxes. However, any gains or losses upon sale prior to maturity, 
computed net of the accrued interest to the settlement date of the sale, was 
subject to capital gains tax. See Treasury Decision 4276, November 22, 1929, 
reprinted in 1930 Treasury Annual Report, pp. 306-8. The latter provision 
proved unworkable and was eliminated by the Act of June 17, 1930, 46 Stat. 
775. See amended Treasury Circular no. 418, June 25, 1930, reprinted in 1930 
Treasury Annual Report, pp. 309-12, letter dated June 30, 1930, from Andrew 
Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, reprinted in 1930 Treasury Annual Report, 
p. 309, 1930 Treasury Annual Report, p. 23 (“The bookkeeping records 
required in order to calculate gains, as differentiated from exempt interest, 
were so complicated that a very real sales resistance resulted.”), and Beckhart, 
Smith, and Brown (1932, p. 354, fn. 34) (The corrective measure “was rendered 
necessary by the large amount of burdensome bookkeeping necessary to 
comply with the terms of the Act of June, 1929.”).
54 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no. 949, December 10, 1929. See also 
Treasury Circular no. 418, November 22, 1923, reprinted in 1930 Treasury Annual 
Report, pp. 303-6, and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no. 944, 
November 23, 1929.
(for example, 99.172 percent). Tenders would be accepted in 
order of decreasing bid price (auction market participants 
could submit multiple tenders with different bids) and tenders 
at the lowest accepted price (the “stop-out” price) would be 
allotted securities on a pro-rata basis. Payment would be due 
on the settlement date in immediately available funds and 
could not be made by crediting a War Loan account.
On Saturday, December 14, the Treasury announced that 
investors had bid for $224 million of the new bills and that it 
had accepted tenders starting at the highest bid, 99.310 percent, 
and stopping at 99.152 percent.56 Tenders bidding at the stop 
were allotted 80 percent of the amount bid for.57 The average 
accepted price was 99.181. A syndicate of two dealers, Salomon 
Brothers & Hutzler and the International Manhattan Company, 
won the major portion of the offering and promptly reoffered 
$70 million of the bills at a discount rate of 3 1/8 percent, or a 
price of 99.219.58
Under Secretary Mills stated that he was “entirely satisfied” 
with the results of the auction and that the auction had resulted 
in “considerably cheaper money than we could get through the 
medium of certificates of indebtedness . . . .”59 He further noted 
that the government would henceforth be able to tailor its 
borrowings more closely to its needs: “We will not be in a 
position where we have to borrow a lot of money and hold it in 
anticipation of needs for which we have only estimates . . . . We 
will sell government bills to fit the immediate needs and make 
the maturities fit into a known time of income, that is, the tax-
paying dates.”60
4.3 Subsequent Bill Offerings in 1930
The Treasury offered Treasury bills on seven occasions in 1930 
(Table 6). The offerings were all in the middle of the first or 
55 Bidding on a price basis insulated the Treasury from specifying how bids in 
terms of interest rates would be converted to prices. Market participants used 
a variety of conventions. For example, the price of a bill with n days to maturity 
quoted at a discount rate of D is P = 100 – (n/360)×D. The price of the same bill 
quoted at a money market yield of R is P = 100/[1+.01×(n/360)×R]. In the case 
of a ninety-day bill quoted at 4.50 percent, P = 98.875 if the quoted rate is a 
discount rate, that is, if D = 4.50 percent, and P = 98.888 if the quoted rate is a 
money market yield, that is, if R = 4.50 percent.
56 “Plan Further Use of Treasury Bills,” New York Times, December 15, 1929, p. 16.
57 “Treasury Bills Well Received,” Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1929, p. 12.
58 “3 1/8% Discount Rate on Treasury Bills,” New York Times, December 16, 
1919, p. 47. The International Manhattan Company was the securities division 
formed following the March 1929 merger of the International Acceptance 
Bank, Inc., and the Bank of Manhattan. The reoffering price is computed as 
99.219 = 100 – (90/360)×3.125.
59 “Plan Further Use of Treasury Bills,” New York Times, December 15, 1929, p. 16, 
and “Issue Satisfies Mills,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 1929, p. 11.
60 “Plan Further Use of Treasury Bills,” New York Times, December 15, 1929, p. 16.  44 Why the U.S. Treasury Began Auctioning Treasury Bills in 1929
second month of a quarter, suggesting that the Treasury did, in 
fact, modify its financing practices by selling bills when it 
needed cash.
It is interesting to note that four of the six offerings that 
matured in 1930 did not mature on a tax payment date (the 
exceptions are the July offering that matured in September and 
the twin offering in October that matured in December) and 
that all four of those offerings were refinanced at maturity with 
new bills. This suggests that Treasury officials began at an early 
date to incorporate Treasury bills into their debt management 
operations and that they did not limit the use of Treasury bills 
to sporadic cash management needs.
5.  Treasury Bills in the Early 1930s
The Treasury began issuing bills just as the Great Depression 
was beginning. It is hardly surprising that officials did not use 
the new instrument quite as they had anticipated in 1929; 
evolving circumstances can prompt change in the use of any 
financial instrument.
As the contraction of 1930 deepened and hardened into 
depression in 1931, the Treasury began to issue thirteen-week bills 
almost every week (Chart 7). Although issue sizes varied from 
week to week (Chart 8), the aggregate volume of bills outstanding 
rose fairly steadily to more than $500 million by the end of 1931 
(Chart 9). The quantity of bills outstanding stabilized during 1932, 
but then rose sharply in 1933 and again in 1934, reaching almost 
$2 billion at the end of 1934. By the end of 1934, Treasury bills had 
become an instrument of debt management—part of the more or 
less permanent debt of the nation.
Treasury officials did not originally intend to replace 
certificates of indebtedness with Treasury bills. Secretary 
Mellon stated in 1929 that “It is not the purpose of the Treasury 
Department . . .  to discontinue the present depositary method, 
or system of short-term financing, but rather to supplement it 
with the new system, using both as may prove to be most 
advantageous to the interests of the government.”61 Neverthe-
less, when Treasury officials expanded bill issuance in 1934, 
they simultaneously stopped offering certificates of 
indebtedness. By the end of 1934, bills were the short-term 
instrument of Treasury debt management.
6. Conclusion
The U.S. Treasury began auctioning Treasury bills in 1929 to 
correct several flaws in the post-war structure of Treasury 
financing operations. The flaws included underpricing securities 
sold in fixed-price subscription offerings, infrequent financings 
that necessitated borrowing in advance of need, and payment 
with deposit credits that gave banks an added incentive to 
oversubscribe to new issues and contributed to the appearance of 
weak post-offering secondary markets for new issues.
All three flaws could have been addressed without 
introducing a new class of securities. For example, the Treasury 
could have begun auctioning certificates of indebtedness 
(instead of bills),62 it could have begun offering certificates 
61 1929 Treasury Annual Report, p. 275. See also the April 25, 1929, speech of 
Under Secretary Mills before the American Institute of Banking (1929 Treasury 
Annual Report, pp. 275-80, and “Mills Explains Aim of Treasury Bills,” New York 
Times, April 25, 1929, p. 42).
Table 6
Treasury Bill Sales in 1930
      
Auction Date Issue Date Maturity Date Term (Days) Amount (Millions of Dollars)
February 14, 1930 February 18, 1930 May 19, 1930 90 50
April 11, 1930 April 15, 1930 July 14, 1930 90 50
May 15, 1930 May 19, 1930 August 18, 1930 91 100
July 10, 1930 July 14, 1930 September 15, 1930 63 50
August 14, 1930 August 18, 1930 November 17, 1930 91 120
October 10, 1930a October 15, 1930 December 16, 1930 62 50
October 10, 1930a October 16, 1930 December 17, 1930 62 50
November 13, 1930 November 17, 1930 February 16, 1931 91 125
Source: Treasury annual reports.
aThe Treasury offered a total of $100 million bills. Each accepted tender was allocated half of the amount bid for in bills issued on October 15 and maturing 
on December 16, 1930, and the other half in bills issued on October 16 and maturing on December 17, 1930.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2008 45
Source: Treasury annual reports.
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62 However, the statutory restriction on selling certificates of indebtedness 
below par would have limited the ability of the Treasury to offer the securities 
in an auction format. A minimum price restriction nearly led to a failed bond 
auction in 1894 (“Carlisle Talks to Bankers,” New York Times, January 30, 1894, 
p. 1, “Success Crowns the Loan,” New York Times, February 1, 1894, p. 1, 
Barnes 1931, pp. 315-8, and Carosso 1987, p. 316) and contributed to a failed 
auction in 1973 (Garbade 2004, p. 38).
between quarterly tax dates, and it could have begun selling 
certificates for immediately available funds. However, by 
introducing a new class of securities, the Treasury was able to 
address the defects in the existing primary market structure 
even as it continued to maintain that structure. If auction sales, 
tactical issuance, and settlement in immediately available funds 
proved successful, the new procedure could be expanded to 
notes and bonds.63 If subsequent experience revealed an 
unanticipated flaw in the new procedure, however, the 
Treasury was free to return to exclusive reliance on regularly 
scheduled fixed-price subscription offerings and payment by 
credit to War Loan accounts. The introduction of Treasury 
bills in 1929 gave the Treasury an exit strategy—as well as a way 
forward—in the development of the primary market for 
Treasury securities.
63 The Treasury initially continued to offer notes and bonds on a fixed-price 
subscription basis, and continued to receive large oversubscriptions to those 
offerings, following the introduction of Treasury bills. (As noted earlier, the 
Treasury suspended certificate sales in 1934.) It attempted to introduce an 
auction system for bond sales in 1935, but the effort floundered and the 
Treasury thereafter sold notes and bonds on a fixed-price subscription basis 
through the early 1960s. It tried—and failed—to introduce auction sales of 
bonds again in 1963 and finally succeeded on its third attempt in the early 
1970s. See Garbade (2004).References
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